The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: TEPCO's Involvement

Nov 15, 2011
Kitty Grey

A US Navy Barge Transports Water to Aid Cooling - Wikimedia Commons

The second most devastating reactor event in human history could have been prevented had several falsified safety documents not been incurred by TEPCO.

On March 11, 2011, the Touhoku tsunami and accompanying earthquake caused a string of failures and meltdowns at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. The plant was the centre of various safety records scandals apparently ongoing since at least 2002. The discovery of the documents revealed previously undisclosed information regarding the plant’s unexamined cooling components and its capability to withstand seismic activity and tsunami waves.

Saftey Records Falsified

In 2002, the Tokyo Electric Power Company admitted to falsifying safety records, including neglecting inspections to certain electrical circuitry and cooling mechanisms. TEPCO was directed to shut down all of its 17 nuclear reactors in 2003 in order to make amends for its myopia.

Six years later in 2008, International Atomic Energy Agency officials warned that seismic events above 7.0 in magnitude could cause serious problems at the reactor complex and other reactors in Japan.

Simulation Reports Delayed

Based on data from an 1896 earthquake, simulations showed that the plant was incapable of withstanding tsunami waves above 8.4 metres in height. The testing asserted that the occurrence of such could overflow the plant, causing failures to systems inside the facility. Released to NISA (the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, a part of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) upon request of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, a report of TEPCO in October 2011 revealed that it was aware of the possibility of damaging seismic and aquatic events. The original report conducted in 2008 failed to reach NISA until March 7, 2011, four days before the tsunami struck. Despite assertions from TEPCO representative Junichi Matsumoto that the company didn’t feel the need to act quickly, Nuclear Industry and Safety Agency officials concluded that the reports should have been made public and that the company should have responded immediately to the data.

In addition, it was revealed that TEPCO had not planned an investigation of the plant until after April 2011, and further action would not be executed until October 2012.